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The Impact of the Global Recession on South Africa (ARI) 
 
Hein Marais * 
 
 
Theme: This paper examines the impact of the global economic recession on South 
Africa’s economy and society, the ways in which the country’s government has chosen to 
respond to that crisis, and its likely social and political fall-out. 
 
 
Summary: Despite initial official denials, South Africa’s economy has entered in its first 
recession in almost two decades. The recession is predicted to last into 2010 and the 
social impact is likely to prove punishing. The African National Congress (ANC), re-
elected to office in April, has pledged to cushion the shock with a package of measures 
that include an overhauled industrial policy. But a shift to the left in economic policy is 
highly unlikely, and the ANC remains ambivalent about further expanding its social grant 
system for the poor. A vibrant, ongoing tradition of social protest means that the political 







South Africans have been known to think themselves different from the rest of Africa, a 
notion the Ugandan intellectual Mahmood Mamdani famously railed against in the 1990s 
as ‘South African exceptionalism’.1 But it is not often that they believe they are inoculated 
against the effects of a global calamity. And yet, until well into 2009, South Africa’s 
political and business elites seemed to languish in a state of denial and were broadcasting 
predictions of another year of positive economic growth, even as credit markets around 
the world asphyxiated and global demand dissolved. 
 
There has been much talk about ‘solid fundamentals’, the maturity of South Africa’s 
banking sector and the avowed underlying strengths of the economy. South Africa has 
spent more than a decade trying to ingratiate itself with international markets and 
investors, and to integrate more deeply into the global system an economy that is still 
heavily reliant on commodity exports. The reward has been a decade of modest economic 
growth and the (temporary) erasure of a budget deficit, albeit accompanied by several 
years of stingy public spending and widening income inequalities. Economic growth, in 
fact, has not been spectacular compared with other ‘developing’ economies. The average 
annual rate of GDP growth was 2.8% between 1994 and 2003 (Gelb, 2005)2 and reached 
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1 M. Mamdani (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Capitalism, David 
Philip, Cape Town. 
2 S. Gelb (2005), ‘An Overview of the South African Economy’, in R. Daniel, R. Southall & J. Lutchman (Eds.), 
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about 5% between 2004 and 2007, although the annual per capita increased by a little 
more than 1%. Although the underlying structure of the economy has changed little, as 
economists Ben Fine and Seeraj Mohammed have shown,3 trade and financial 
liberalisation has exposed the economy to global vagaries. 
 
State of Denial 
Yet even as global credit tightened, commodity prices fell and demand shrank, local 
economists were heralding a predicted 1.2% GDP growth rate for 2009 as ‘heroic’ and 
praising the (then) Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, for his ‘prudent’ determination to 
maintain ‘sustainable finances’ despite falling tax revenues. Manuel, meanwhile, was 
issuing assurances that ‘we are not looking at a recession in South Africa’.4 The major 
ratings agencies were impressed enough to maintain South Africa’s mid-investment grade 
credit rating of BBB+.5 The World Bank concurred: as late as March it was still forecasting 
positive GDP growth of 1% for 2009 in South Africa.6 
 
‘We were assured our financial sector was prudentially managed and well regulated’, the 
South African Communist Party intellectual, now deputy Transport Minister, Jeremy 
Cronin, wrote in March. ‘We were, supposedly, relatively well insulated. A growth rate of 
3%-4% for 2009 was still confidently predicted’.7 
 
Even the Economist magazine did not share the bullishness. Assessing the vulnerability 
of middle-income countries to global ‘contagion’ in February, it stamped South Africa as 
the riskiest of the 17 surveyed countries. A current account deficit of 8% or more of GDP 
was predicted (roughly the size of Thailand’s on the eve of its 1997/98 crisis), South 
Africa’s short-term debt was estimated at 81% of reserves, and its bank loan to deposit 
ratio stood at 1.09.8 
 
It’s now clear that SA’s decade-long spurt of economic growth reversed in late 2008 
already. The economy shrank by 1.8% in the final quarter of 2008 and by an annualised, 
quarter-on-quarter 6.4% in the first three months of 2009.9 
 
‘We have entered a recession,’ Jacob Zuma admitted in June, a few weeks after he had 
replaced the ousted Thabo Mbeki as President. Still, he felt it necessary to add that ‘SA 
has not been affected to the extent that a number of other countries have’.10 The central 
                                                                                                                                                   
State of the Nation: South Africa 2004-2005, Human Sciences Research Council, Cape Town. 
3 The economy remains dominated by integrally connected core activities in the mining and energy sectors, 
which span the private/public divide. The biggest change has been the increasing financialisation of the 
economy. See, for example, S. Mohammed (2009), ‘Financialization, the Minerals Energy Complex and South 
African Labour’, paper presented to the 5th Global Labour University Conference, 22-24 February, Mumbai, 
and B. Fine (2008), ‘The Minerals Energy Complex is Dead: Long Live the MEC’, paper presented to Amandla 
Colloquium, April, Cape Town, https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/5617/. 
4 Roelf Wendell, ‘Manuel Sees No Recession but Inflation to Fall’, Mail & Guardian, 18/XI/2008. 
5 Konrad Reuss, ‘Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) MD for SA and Southern Africa’, quoted in Mariam Issa, ‘SA’s 
Expected Growth Rate “Looks Heroic”, Business Day, 12/II/2009. A few days earlier, Manuel had announced 
that South Africa would run a main budget deficit of about 4% in 2009, mainly to keep an official infrastructure 
spending programme on track, and compensate for a slowdown in tax revenues. The country’s overall debt 
stands at 26% of GDP, down from close to 50% a decade ago. 
6 Edward West, ‘Market Recovery Stalls on Grim World Bank Forecast’, Business Day, 23/VI/2009. 
7 Jeremy Cronin, ‘Endless, Resource-depleting Growth is no Longer Possible’, Business Day, 13/III/2009. 
8 ‘Domino Theory’, The Economist, 26/II/2009, 
http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13184631&amp;subjectID=3
48918&amp;fsrc=nwl. 
9 Gordon Bell, ‘Contracts Most since 1984: GDP Fell Annualised 6.4%’, Reuters, 26/V/2009. 
10 Jacob Zuma, State of the Nation speech, 3/VI/2009, Parliament, Cape Town. 
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bank governor, Tito Mboweni, meanwhile, was claiming that ‘the worst is probably behind 
us’.11 
 
But the doleful statistics were telling another story. Output in the mining sector shrank by 
33% in the final quarter of 2008, its biggest decrease on record.12 The manufacturing 
sector (which together with retail accounts for about one third of total output) shrank by 
22% (also a record),13 and more than 21% of factory productive capacity is standing idle.14 
Consumer spending is on the skids (shrinking by almost 5%, its biggest contraction for 13 
years),15 there was a 47% rise in company failures in the first four months of 2009 and 
household debt had risen to about 80% of disposable income (from around 50% six years 
ago).16 
 
Although the Treasury had relaxed exchange control more than two dozen times since 
1994, remnants of earlier controls might have cushioned the South African financial sector 
from the worst of the initial toxic debt-driven crisis in global financial markets. But there 
was never any prospect of South Africa’s real economy dodging the effects of the 
subsequent global recession. So the value of South Africa’s exports fell by 24% in the first 
quarter of 2009, as demand dried up and commodity prices fell. That piled further 
pressure on one of the economy’s chronic vulnerabilities, its current account deficit, which 
has grown to an alarming 7% of GDP.17 That deficit would be even larger were it not for 
(mainly short-term) capital flows to bonds, shares and equities. 
 
The latest forecasts predict the economy will contract at least 1.4% and possibly by more 
than 2% in 2009. With more than 20% of factory productive capacity standing idle,18 local 
private investment is very unlikely to drive a quick recovery. Public investment will have to 
pick up the slack –but it accounts for a minor share of total investment in South Africa–. 
Ultimately, a recovery depends primarily on developments in South Africa’s main trading 
partners in Europe and North America. 
 
Punishing Social Costs 
The social costs are punishing, and they will leave their mark well beyond the official ‘end’ 
of the recession. 
 
The country’s central statistical service revealed in June that 179 000 jobs had been lost 
in the first three months of 2009,19 which suggests that analysts’ forecasts of job losses 
totalling 400,000 over the year might turn out to be optimistic.20 The Department of Labour 
said it had received more than 226,000 applications for unemployment insurance between 
September 2008 and the end of February.21 These represent the ‘privileged’ strata of 
                                                 
11 Mariam Isa, ‘Mboweni Signals a Recession as Output Plummets’, Business Day, 20/V/2009. 
12 Bell, ‘Contracts...’, op. cit. 
13 ‘SA Trade Deficit Hits Record in January’, Mail & Guardian, 27/II/2009. 
14 Ethel Hazelhurst, ‘Household Spending Still in Descent’, Business Report, 18/VI/2009; Mariam Isa, 
‘Shrinking Factory Output Points to Rates Cut’, Business Day, 13/V/2009. 
15 Mariam Isa, ‘Weak Exports put Pressure on Current Account Deficit’, Business Day, 19/VI/2009. 
16 Ethel Hazelhurst, ‘Household spending...’, op. cit.; S. Stuart Theobold, ‘Banks Paint a Dark Picture of Bad 
Debt and Big Write-offs’, Sunday Times, 15/III/2009. 
17 Mariam Isa, ‘Weak Exports...’, op. cit.; Ethel Hazelhurst, ‘Current Account Gap Widens to 7%, but Rand 
Remains Firm’, Business Report, 18/VI/2009. 
18 Ethel Hazelhurst, ‘Household spending...’, op. cit. 
19 One third of those jobs were lost in the wholesale and retail sector, a quarter in the financial services and 
one sixth in manufacturing. 
20 Mariam Isa, ‘SA Loses 179,000 Jobs in One Quarter as Slump Hits Hard’, Business Day, 24/VI/2009. 
21 Eleanor Momberg, ‘Hard Times as Recession Bites’, Sunday Independent, 12/IV/2009. 
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workers, whose employers contribute to the national unemployment insurance fund, and 
who had formal contracts and held their jobs for more than six months. In South Africa’s 
increasingly casualised labour market,22 it is difficult to know how many temporary jobs 
have been lost. 
 
In a society with very high unemployment and where incomes are distributed widely 
among families and kin, every lost job has huge ramifications. Of the estimated 18 million 
South Africans living below the poverty line in 2004 (R250 in 2000 rands, or 
US$30/month), 14 million were living in about 3 million households in which no-one was 
employed in income-earning activity (Meth, 2006).23 
 
The official unemployment rate rose to 23.5% in the first quarter, from 21.9% in the 
previous quarter, ending a five-year decline. That official rate, though, is a fanciful 
barometer of reality. It does not count as ‘unemployed’ anyone who has ‘not taken active 
steps’ to find work in the four weeks prior to being surveyed. By such reckoning, the 
jobless who are too demoralised, penniless or marginalised to hunt constantly for work 
are ‘not’ unemployed; nor are those persons who admit to an income from ‘hunting’, 
‘begging’ or growing their own food. The actual unemployment rate is closer to 40%, and 
among young African men and women it very probably exceeds 60%. 
 
Turning a Corner? 
Having helped engineer Jacob Zuma’s election as President, the trade union federation 
Cosatu and the South African Communist Party are confident that post-apartheid South 
Africa has turned a corner –towards the left– and that the crisis of recession opens new 
opportunities for consolidating such a shift. They have laid siege to the central bank’s 
conservative monetary policies and are demanding that the government forge ahead with 
a more strident industrial policy and do more to protect jobs. 
 
But a resolute shift to the left in economic policy is highly unlikely. Fresh from another 
resounding victory at the polls (it won 66% of the votes cast in late April), the African 
National Congress (ANC) says it will create millions of new jobs, reduce poverty, and 
improve both infrastructure and services –while maintaining fiscal ‘prudence’ and sticking 
to its by-now customary reluctance to force the hand of South Africa’s conglomerates. In 
June, with the South African economy officially back in the doldrums, the new Finance 
Minister, Pravin Gordhan, was offering assurances that the government would persist with 
the fiscal policies of the previous decade.24 
 
There is some truth to the economist Dawie Roodt’s quip that ‘in SA, the official opposition 
is not the [centre-right] Democratic Alliance, it’s the financial markets’.25 In September 
2008, when the market-friendly Finance Minister Trevor Manuel hinted he might resign, 
the South African currency went into a tailspin, only to recover when he said he would 
stay on. 
 
                                                 
22 There are about 3,000 temporary employment services operating in South Africa; see Lloyd Gedye & 
Karabo Keepile, ‘Going for Broke’, Mail & Guardian, 10/V/2009. 
23 C. Meth (2006), ‘Income Poverty in 2004: A Second Engagement with the Recent van der Berg et al. 
Figures’, Working Paper 47, September, School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
24 Reuters, ‘SA to Maintain Fiscal Policies for Growth’, 23/VI/2009. 
25 The economist Dawie Roodt, quoted in ‘Zuma victory could make markets edgy’, Pretoria News, 18 
December 2009. 
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The ANC also appears to have internalised the conservative prerogatives of South African 
capital. Many of its top officials and cadres have acquired significant business interests, 
much of it via the estimated R300 billion (US$37 billion) worth of ‘black economic 
empowerment’ deals crafted since 1994.26 The ANC itself relies heavily on the largesse of 
these companies for funding.27 In a new book, Moeletsi Mbeki (brother of the former 
President Thabo Mbeki) describes the close ties that have been forged between ‘a small 
class of unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC politicians, 
some retired and others not’ and the incumbent ‘economic oligarchy’. One outcome, he 
argues, is a ‘black elite’ that is cast as ‘junior support players to white-controlled 
corporations’.28 
 
Dealing with the Recession 
Thus far, the government’s response is heavily dependent on measures agreed to before 
the crisis began. There are four main elements: 
 
• Negotiating a framework for a unified response by business, government and trade 
unions, with an emphasis on avoiding, where possible, retrenchments. 
• Interest rate cuts. 
• Proceeding with a three-year infrastructure investment programme. 
• Proceeding with an expanded public-works programme. 
 
A framework plan was agreed to by the government, trade unions and organised business 
last December. The plan’s emphasis is on preventing job losses, creating two million new 
jobs and providing emergency food and other relief to households in distress.29 The 
agreement appeared mainly to reiterate existing commitments. The details, though, are 
still to be thrashed out; it was only in May that task teams started pencilling in some 
specifics. Strikingly, though, the ‘framework’ adopts a docile tone towards the private 
sector, which is asked ‘to maintain and improve wherever possible their levels of fixed 
direct investment’. 
 
The Reserve Bank has been trimming interest rates since December 2008, although the 
repo rate still stood high enough (at 9.5% in April) to tempt investors to dip their toes in 
the South African market, thus attracting short-term capital inflows that are needed to 
prevent the current account from sinking deeper into the red.30 Oddly, the Bank has 
allowed the Rand to appreciate steeply against major currencies, which reduced the value 
                                                 
26 ‘Gravy Train on Track: More than R300-bn Worth of BEE Deals since 1994, Business Times, 13/VII/2008. 
According to the ANC’s Treasurer-general, Matthews Phosa, who presides over a large business and 
empowerment portfolio, ‘NEC members, like any South Africans, have a right to participate in business. It’s 
their constitution right’ (ibid). The NEC is the ANC’s National Executive Committee, its highest decision-
making body. 
27 The oldest of which is Thebe Investments, launched in the early 1990s. Others include Chancellor House, 
which former ANC member of parliament Andrew Feinstein describes as ‘an elaborate network of 
companies… established to utilize black economic empowerment deals to raise money for the ruling party’. 
See A. Feinstein (2007), After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey inside the ANC, Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, Johannesburg, p. 242. 
28 See Moeletsi Mbeki, ‘The Oligarchs are Still in Place’, Sunday Independent, 14/VI/2009, 
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=21064); and M. Mbeki (2009), Architects of Poverty: Why Africa’s 
Capitalism needs Changing, Picador Africa. 
29 ‘Plan to Tackle Crisis Gathers Momentum’, Business Day, 12/VI/2009. 
30 According to Patrick Bond, trade and financial liberalisation since the mid-1990s has left South Africa more 
vulnerable to financial contagion; the emergence of a large trade deficit has compelled more foreign borrowing 
and a greater reliance on inflows of short-term capital to pay for soaring imports. See Patrick Bond (2008), 
‘South African Financialization Reflects World Economic Problems’, Amandla!, October. 
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of mineral and manufactured exports in the face of rapidly shrinking global demand. The 
reasons not to move against currency appreciation are likely to be many-layered. The 
most obvious would be to reduce the cost of imports that are destined for the 
government’s overhaul of transport, energy and other infrastructure. But there are 
probably deeper, structural imperatives at play, as well –chief among them a desire to 
prop up the purchasing power of the Rand in support of the investment forays of South 
African firms and conglomerates in Africa and beyond. 
 
The government’s core response will be its three-year R787 billion (US$98 billion) public 
infrastructure expansion programme, which focuses on upgrading and expanding 
transport infrastructure (which had been poorly maintained since the early 1980s), 
boosting electricity production and provision, repairing a deteriorating public health system 
that is buckling under the world’s worst AIDS epidemic and expanding the provision of 
water and sanitation. Indeed, the main growth momentum so far this year has come from 
public spending, which quickened to 6.4% in the first quarter. Overall, though, private 
investment comprises about 70% of total investment; without a major upturn in demand, 
corporations active in South Africa are unlikely to increase investment. 
 
A scaled-up industrial policy action plan is to focus on the automotive, chemicals, metal 
fabrication, tourism, clothing and textiles sectors as well as forestry. The stated intention 
now is to ‘rebuild local industrial capacity and avoid de-industrialisation’. There has been 
talk of the ‘strong, robust use of accepted trade measures’, such as raising some tariffs 
within the limits determined under the WTO, to protect local industry. Neil Coleman, 
formerly of Cosatu and now adviser to Trevor Manuel in his new role as Planning Minister, 
has hailed what he regards as a shift to the ‘real economy’. President Zuma, he said, 
‘talks to a more diversified industrial strategy. To date the government’s industrial policy 
measures have not really bitten, now it’s the flagship’, Coleman said.31 Also, the 
government has proved willing to bail out embattled companies; by mid-June, seven 
companies had been thrown lifelines (worth R500 million, or US$62 million) by the 
Industrial Development Corporation, and another R3 billion (US$480 million) was being 
set aside to help other companies in distress.32 The main criterion for extending help 
seems to be the company’s potential value within production chains.33 
 
The government says it will create 500,000 ‘job opportunities’34 this year –mainly through 
a public-works programme– and will have added 4 million new jobs by 2014. It is not clear 
what would count as a ‘new job’, however. Since 2000, only 1.7 million new jobs were 
created, a large percentage of them casualised, temporary and low-paying. The 
government insists it will create ‘decent work’, but it has also admitted that most new jobs 
in 2009 will be temporary and part of its Expanded Public Works Programme.35 It claims 
                                                 
31 Karima Brown, ‘Developmental State Remains the Objective’, Business Day, 4/VI/2009, 
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=72533. Again the myth of the Polokwane watershed: 
the infrastructure investment programme has been five years in the making, and the expanded public workers 
programme began during Mbeki’s second term as President. 
32 Brendan Boyle, ‘Global Economic Crisis has SA Companies Running for Cover’, Business Times, 
13/VI/2009. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The debt to ‘New Labour’ semantics in the UK should be obvious. 
35 The Economic Development Minister Ebrahim Patel claimed there would be a synergistic relationship 
between short-term public works jobs and more secure, longer-term employment (see Linda Ensor, ‘State 
Takes a “Progressive” Line on Jobs’, Business Day, 22/VI/2009). The ANC has grown fond of such wordplay 
to mask tensions in its policies. More broadly, after the ousting of the former President Thabo Mbeki, it has 
claimed to be following a course of ‘continuity and change’ –a flourish it hopes inoculates against 
disparagement from both left and right–. 
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that those jobs eventually would serve as bridges toward more secure employment, but 
this is unlikely in a labour market that has structurally shifted away from secure, rights-
based employment. 
 
Cosatu and the South African Communist Party are hailing these kinds of moves as proof 
of an alleged progressive turn under President Jacob Zuma, away from the market-
friendly policies that were spearheaded and enforced by his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki. 
The Communist Party, richly represented in the new Zuma cabinet, views these 
commitments as proof of a sea-change in the ANC government’s approach to the 
economy: 
 
‘With our state-led infrastructure programme and commitment to expanding public 
employment in health, education, policing and public works we acknowledge that the 
public sector… is a producer and employer in its own right. With our commitment to 
improving the state’s long-range planning and co-ordination capacity, we say we have to 
move beyond defensive measures to place ourselves on a different development path’.36 
 
In truth, though, the infrastructure plan was hatched five years ago, during the heyday of 
Mbeki. The expanded public works programme also dates back several years and so 
does the social grant system, which was expanded considerably during Mbeki’s tenure 
and which has proved to be the single-most effective poverty-reducing tool used by the 
government (Meth, 2006).37 
 
Whether measured by income or by a more expansive matrix, poverty levels have fallen 
since 2000-01 largely due to the extended eligibility and greater take-up of social grants 
(especially the child-support grant, as well as old-age pensions), as development 
economist Charles Meth has shown in his scrutiny of the data (2006, 2008).38 
 
Ambivalence 
An estimated 13 million South Africans benefit from the social grant system, which ranks 
among the most extensive in middle-income countries. Further expansion is likely, with 
the system functioning as the main bulwark against deepening poverty and distress for 
the foreseeable future. 
 
The ANC, however, has remained ambivalent towards these transfers. On the one hand, 
they demonstrate its expressed commitment to shield the poor against privation, a stance 
which also carries political reward. At the same time, as the sociologist David Everatt 
(2009) has noted, there is a deep, moralising disdain for nurturing so-called ‘dependency’ 
on the state.39 Thus, according to President Zuma, social grants should be linked to jobs 
or economic activity ‘to encourage self-reliance amongst the able-bodied’.40 Zuma was 
echoing sentiments often voiced by Mbeki, who as President spoke regularly of the need 
                                                 
36 Jeremy Cronin, ‘Endless...’, op. cit. 
37 According to van der Berg et al. (2005), the poverty headcount fell by 3 million in 2001-04. In his detailed 
examination of those findings, Meth (2006) criticises van der Berg’s claim that ‘improved job creation in recent 
years’ possibly also lowered the poverty headcount, and shifts the headcount decrease closer to 1.5 million. 
See S. van der Berg, R. Burger, M. Louw & D. Yu (2005), ‘Trends in Poverty and Inequality since the Political 
Transition’, Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers nr 1, 2005, and C. Meth (2006), op.cit. 
38 C. Meth (2006), op. cit.; C. Meth (2008), ‘The (Lame) Duck Unchained Tries to Count the Poor’, Working 
Paper nr 49, School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. 
39 D. Everatt (2009), ‘The Undeserving Poor: Poverty and the Politics of Service Delivery in the Poorest Nodes 
of South Africa’, Politikon (forthcoming). 
40 Linda Ensor, ‘Zuma Unveils Plan to Fight Recession, Tackle Poverty’, Business Day, 5/VI/2009. 
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for the poor to ‘mature’ and ‘graduate out of dependence on social grants and enter the 
labour market’.41 
 
These notions have done the rounds in the ANC for several years, with social grants 
sometimes referred to, in Reaganite fashion, as ‘hand-outs’.42 Last year, Trevor Manuel 
complained during a World Bank gathering in Cape Town that the poor had to take more 
responsibility for the improvement of their situation: ‘The poor should get actively involved 
– unfortunately this link is lacking in South Africa.’ 43 
 
So, on the one hand, social transfers carry great political value for a party that needs to 
demonstrate its commitment to the poor (especially in the context of structural high 
unemployment and a worsening recession). On the other hand, they are at variance with 
an ongoing commitment to fiscal ‘prudency’, and they seem to trigger a visceral aversion 





The political consequences of the economic recession are difficult to predict. In April, in 
the country’s fourth general election since the official end of apartheid in 1994, the ruling 
ANC again triumphed resoundingly. Coming after punishing internecine conflict and a split 
that led to the formation of the rival Congress of the People (Cope) party, the victory 
attests to the ANC’s ongoing hegemony in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
But such electoral endorsement is not a blank cheque. The absence of a serious political 
rival does not necessarily buy the ANC an easy ride between elections. South Africa is 
believed to have one of the highest per capita rates of protest action in the world, and 
South Africans are not bashful about criticising a government most of them vote for at the 
polls. A great deal of these complaints are vented at local politicians and bureaucracies, 
which, in a recent admission by the Minister for Cooperative Governance, Sicelo Shiceka, 
are ‘perceived to be incompetent, disorganized and riddled with corruption and 
maladministration’.44 
 
A recent study of municipalities in North West province, which fringes on the country’s 
economic powerhouse, Gauteng province, uncovered widespread dysfunction that ranged 
from a lack of accountability and poor service delivery, to weak financial management, 
fraud and corruption. It’s unlikely to be an aberration, as Shiceka has admitted.45 
 
Enmeshed as they are with webs of local power-broking and patronage, the country’s 
municipal bureaucracies will prove difficult to rehabilitate, especially those in peri-urban 
and rural areas. The ANC’s mobilising base –its countrywide network of branches– relies 
                                                 
41 T. Mbeki (2007), State of the Nation Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki: Joint Sitting of 
Parliament, 9 February, Cape Town. 
42 Newspaper reports, for example, have quoted former Public Service and Administration Minister Geraldine 
Fraser-Moleketi imploring communities ‘to change the thinking of those who held out their hands for help but 
kept their sleeves down; see Andre Koopman, ‘Poor Urged to Roll up their Sleeves’, Cape Times, 25/V/1999. 
43 ‘Poor Urged to Pull themselves up’, Daily News, 22/V/2008, p. 6. The latest ANC policy resolutions state 
bluntly that ‘grants must not create dependency and thus must be linked to economic activity’; see ANC 
(2007), ANC 52nd National Conference 2007 Resolutions, ANC, Johannesburg, p. 13, 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conference52/index.html. 
44 SA Press Association, ‘SA’s Municipalities in ‘State of Paralysis’, Mail & Guardian, 10/VI/2009. 
45 SA Press Association, ‘SA’s Municipalities...’, op. cit. 
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on the muscle and connections of these local politicians. A cleanup will no doubt be 
attempted, but it is likely to be fitful and uneven, and probably will target out-of-favour 
officials, particularly those whose loyalties are perceived to rest with the ousted Thabo 
Mbeki or the breakaway Cope party. 
 
While protests against perceived neglect, failure or favouritism will persist, these will 
remain inchoate and uncoordinated. Not to be ruled out, however, is the prospect of 
further eruptions of xenophobia. Last year’s pogroms (which killed 62 people, injured 
hundreds and uprooted tens of thousands) occurred almost exclusively on urban 
peripheries, in informal settlements and in zones of intense informal trading –settings 
were scarcity and intense competition for housing, services, commerce and jobs 
converge–. All had high concentrations of foreigners, were largely ‘out of bounds’ for the 
police, were poorly serviced and weakly integrated into local governance systems, and 
had weak political structures.46 
 
The most focused –and forceful– pressure will come from Cosatu and the South African 
Communist Party, though they are likely to find themselves punching above their weight. 
 
Having helped orchestrate the ousting of Mbeki and Jacob Zuma’s succession, these 
main organisations of the left are confident that they have indebted Zuma to such an 
extent that they can now proceed with what they still regard as a ‘national democratic 
revolution’ that eventually will culminate in a variant of socialism. They run the risk, 
though, of overplaying their hand. 
 
Cosatu, still the largest trade union federation in the land, is capable of pressing its 
demands with strike action, were that point to be reached. But in the overall scheme of 
things Cosatu is perhaps not as muscular as it believes. In relation to the private sector, 
its power appears to be waning; the labour market has been convulsed by shifts to 
capital-intensive industrial production, out-contracting and temporary and insecure work. 
Some of its strongest affiliates in the private sector have been entangled in corporatist 
deal-making with employers. Its support, though, within the public service remains strong 
enough to embarrass, even bruise, the government. An unfavourable balance of forces 
might thrust Cosatu along the curious route of attacking a close political ally in order to try 
and win gains it cannot wrest from capital itself. If it is to win this high-risk game, Cosatu 
would need to pick its battles with great care. 
 
Zuma’s rise to power has left him indebted to a wide variety of stakeholders, many of 
them with little interest in redistributive policies that might cramp their ability to accumulate 
wealth. His own impulses lean towards a repertoire of populist flourishes that will include 
gestures designed to appease a variety of political sensibilities. The left does not own him. 
 
Hein Marais 
Johannesburg-based writer and analyst; an updated third edition of his book ‘South Africa: 
Limits to Change – The Political Economy of Transition’ (Juta & Zed Books) will appear in 
mid-2010 
 
                                                 
46 Hein Marais (2008), ‘Learning from the Pogroms’, Amandla, 1(3), August/September, 
http://www.amandla.org.za. 
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